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 NOTE 
Slanting Trademark Choices in the Right 
Direction: Why Section 2(a) of the Lanham 
Act Promotes the Interests of Consumers 
In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc), corrected (Feb. 11, 2016), 
cert. granted sub nom. Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016) 
Zachary Kasnetz* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Trademark law has long regulated the use of words and symbols that iden-
tify the sources of goods or services, and since 1905, the federal government 
has provided for the registration of trademarks used in interstate and foreign 
commerce.1  Federal trademark legislation and judicial doctrines comprehen-
sively regulate the scope of trademark rights and the mechanisms for their en-
forcement.  Much of federal trademark law is concerned with what types of 
marks may or may not be registered.  One of the longstanding grounds for 
denying registration was the subject of the case analyzed by this Note. 
In December 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held 
that a provision of federal trademark law was unconstitutional because it vio-
lated the First Amendment, despite the fact that this provision had been on the 
books and regularly applied for over seventy years.  In doing so, it overruled 
an important precedent that the Federal Circuit had reaffirmed on more than 
one occasion. 
Part II discusses the case’s factual and procedural background.  Part III 
provides background on the relevant aspects of federal trademark law govern-
ing registration and the constitutional doctrines relevant to the instant decision.  
Part IV lays out the court’s decision and its reasoning.  Finally, Part V critiques 
the majority’s analysis, particularly its application of the doctrine of unconsti-
tutional conditions.  It then argues that, under the legal doctrines relied upon 
by the majority, section 2(a) of the Lanham Act is constitutional. 
 
* Associate Attorney at Growe, Eisen, Karlen, Eilerts in St. Louis, MO.  J.D., University 
of Missouri School of Law, 2016; B.A. in Government and Politics, University of Mar-
yland, 2013.  I am grateful to Professor Dennis Crouch for the advice and assistance he 
provided me during the writing and editing of this Note. 
 1. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 5:3 (4th ed. West 2016). 
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II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
Simon Shao Tam is the founder and front man for the Asian-American 
dance-rock band THE SLANTS.2  He chose the name because of his Asian 
heritage, his desire to “reclaim” and “take ownership” of Asian stereotypes, 
and because the band drew inspiration from childhood slurs and mocking 
nursery rhymes (about Asian Americans).3  Tam applied for registration of his 
mark with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”), but the trade-
mark examiner denied registration under section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, find-
ing the mark likely referred or would be perceived as referring to people of 
Asian descent in a disparaging way, explaining that the term “slants” had his-
torically been used to “deride and mock” a physical feature (the eyes) of people 
of Asian descent.4 
Tam appealed to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”),5 ar-
guing that his mark was not disparaging.6  The TTAB affirmed the examiner’s 
decision, finding that the mark likely referred to persons of Asian descent and 
that a “substantial composite” of such persons would find the mark disparag-
ing.7  The TTAB also stated that its decision merely denied placement on the 
register and did not restrict Tam’s right to use the mark.8 
Tam appealed the TTAB’s denial to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, arguing that: (1) THE SLANTS was not disparaging of Asian-
Americans, (2) section 2(a) was an unconstitutional abridgment of Tam’s free 
speech rights under the First Amendment, and (3) section 2(a) was unconstitu-
tionally vague.9  The Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s decision, conclud-
ing that substantial evidence supported the finding that THE SLANTS was dis-
paraging or would be perceived as disparaging by a substantial composite of 
 
 2. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2015) [hereinafter Tam II] (en 
banc), corrected (Feb. 11, 2016), cert. granted sub nom. Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 
(2016). 
 3. Id.  For example, the band has albums including “The Yellow Album” and 
“Slanted Eyes, Slanted Hearts” and feels that “Asians should be proud of their cultural 
heritage, and not be offended by stereotypical descriptions.”  Id. (alteration omitted). 
 4. Id. at 1331–32. 
 5. The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over direct appeals from the 
TTAB.  28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4) (2012). 
 6. In re Tam, 108 U.S.P.Q.2d 1305, 2013 WL 5498164 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 26, 
2013), vacated and remanded, Tam II, 808 F.3d 1321. 
 7. Id. at *7–8. 
 8. Id. at *8 (stating that when the UPTO denies registration, “[n]o conduct is 
proscribed, and no tangible form of expression is suppressed” (quoting In re McGinley, 
660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981))). 
 9. Brief on Behalf of Appellant at 17, 43, 48, In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567 (Fed. Cir. 
2015) (No. 2014-1203), 2014 WL 1765085, at *17, *43, *48.  Tam also raised an equal 
protection claim.  Because the en banc court did not address that issue, neither does this 
Note. 
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persons of Asian descent.10  Turning to Tam’s constitutional challenge, the 
panel held that binding precedent foreclosed his First Amendment claim and 
rejected his vagueness claim.11 
In a separate concurring opinion, Judge Moore called on the Federal Cir-
cuit to rehear the case en banc to revisit its existing precedent holding that re-
fusing to register a trademark does not violate the First Amendment.12  She 
then spent ten pages – in a preview of her opinion for the majority in the instant 
case – arguing that section 2(a) was unconstitutional.13  One week after the 
panel’s opinion was issued, the Federal Circuit voted sua sponte to vacate the 
panel opinion, setting the case for reargument before the en banc court to de-
cide if “the bar on registration of disparaging trademarks in [section 2(a)] vio-
late[s] the First Amendment.”14 
The government argued that section 2(a) did not implicate the First 
Amendment because it did not prevent Tam from using his mark but simply 
defined eligibility for a government program.15  Tam argued that section 2(a) 
was a restriction on speech, that it abridged his free speech rights by condition-
ing the benefits of federal registration on the government approving of a mark, 
and therefore section 2(a) was facially unconstitutional.16  The en banc Federal 
Circuit agreed with Tam, holding that (1) section 2(a) did restrict speech and 
was a content-based and viewpoint-based restriction, (2) registering a trade-
mark was not government speech or a government subsidy, and (3) because 
section 2(a) could not pass strict or intermediate scrutiny, it was facially un-
constitutional under the First Amendment.17 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This section lays out the basic legal doctrines relevant to the majority’s 
decision.  Part A provides a general overview of federal trademark law and the 
benefits of federal registration, followed by an explanation of section 2(a)’s 
 
 10. In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 571 (Fed. Cir. 2015) [hereinafter Tam I], vacated en 
banc, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), corrected (Feb. 11, 2016), cert. granted sub nom. 
Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016). 
 11. Id. at 571–72.  In the Federal Circuit’s first case, it adopted all precedent from 
its predecessor, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, and like the other circuits, it 
follows the rule that one panel cannot overrule another.  See South Corp. v. United 
States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982). 
 12. Tam I, 785 F.3d at 573 (Moore, J., concurring). 
 13. Id. 
 14. In re Tam, 600 F. App’x 775, 775 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (mem.). 
 15. En Banc Brief for Appellee at 17, 22, In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(No. 2014-1203), 2015 WL 4400893, at *17, *22. 
 16. Brief on Behalf of Appellant for En Banc Hearing at 14, 23, In re Tam, 785 
F.3d 567 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (No. 14-1203), 2015 WL 3657472, at *14, *23. 
 17. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc), corrected (Feb. 
11, 2016), cert. granted sub nom. Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016). 
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prohibition on the registration of disparaging marks.  Part B discusses the rel-
evant First Amendment doctrines that distinguish between different categories 
of speech and speech regulations.  Finally, Part C summarizes the doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions, which limits the government’s ability to require 
citizens to surrender or waive various rights in order to receive government 
benefits. 
A.  Federal Trademark Law: The Lanham Act 
1.  Framework 
The Lanham Act,18 enacted in 1946, governs federal registration and pro-
tection of trademarks used in interstate commerce.  The Act’s primary goals 
are to (1) prevent consumer confusion and deception and (2) ensure that mark 
holders can protect their marks from misappropriation.19  It covers both trade-
marks, which are any “word, name, [or] symbol . . . used by a person . . . to 
identify and distinguish . . . a unique product,” and service marks, which are 
used in the sale or advertising of services to identify the services of one person 
and distinguish them from the services of others.20  A registrable mark must be 
used in commerce and be sufficiently distinctive, either inherently or through 
the acquisition a of secondary meaning, that it clearly indicates the origin of a 
good or service.21 
Federal registration does not create a trademark or confer ownership, but 
it does give the mark holder substantial legal rights and benefits.22  However, 
even if one cannot or chooses not to register his or her mark, section 43 of the 
Lanham act provides a cause of action for infringement of unregistered marks, 
false advertising, and dilution.23  Finally, every state has its own system of 
 
 18. Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1072 
(2012)). 
 19. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 5:4.  These are also the general goals of trade-
mark law.  Id.  There is substantial scholarly disagreement over whether trademarks 
should be treated as property.  See Mark Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the 
Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1694 (1999) [hereinafter Lemley, Death 
of Common Sense]. 
 20. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).  Technically, the Lanham Act distinguishes between 
trademarks and service marks, but because the term mark is used to refer to both, this 
Note does so as well. 
 21. See Otto Roth & Co. v. Universal Foods Corp., 640 F.2d 1317, 1321 (C.C.P.A. 
1981). 
 22. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 19:3; see 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f).  These benefits 
include: exclusive nationwide use of the mark, presumed validity of the mark, incon-
testability after five years of consecutive post-registration use, a complete defense to 
state law dilution claims, and treble damages for willful infringement.  Tam II, 808 F.3d 
at 1328–29. 
 23. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 27:9. 
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trademark registration and protection that operates parallel to federal registra-
tion.24 
To register a mark, the holder must apply with the USPTO.25  The appli-
cation is examined ex parte by an examiner to determine whether the proposed 
mark satisfies the legal requirements for placement on the federal registry.26  If 
the examiner determines that the mark does not satisfy the requirements, an 
applicant can appeal the decision to the TTAB.27  Finally, if the refusal is af-
firmed, an applicant can appeal to the Federal Circuit or seek de novo review 
in a U.S. district court.28 
2.  Section 2(a)’s Prohibition on Registering Disparaging Trademarks 
Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act bars registration of any mark that “may 
disparage . . . persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, 
or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.”29  A mark is disparaging if it “dis-
honors by comparison [to the person or group] with what is inferior, slights, 
deprecates, degrades, or affects or injures by unjust comparison.”30  The 
USPTO uses a two-part test to determine if a mark is potentially disparaging.31  
Specifically, it asks: 
(1) [W]hat is the likely meaning of the matter in question, taking into 
account not only dictionary definitions, but also the relationship of the 
matter to the other elements in the mark, the nature of the goods or ser-
vices, and the manner in which the mark is used in the marketplace in 
connection with the goods or services; and 
 
 24. Lee Ann W. Lockridge, Abolishing State Trademark Registrations, 29 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 597, 598 (2011). 
 25. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1). 
 26. Id. § 1062. 
 27. Id. § 1070. 
 28. Id. § 1071. 
 29. Id. § 1052(a).  Section 2(a) also prohibits registration of any mark that “[c]on-
sists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter.”  For an application, 
see In re Fox, 702 F.3d 633, 634 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (denying registration to 
COCK SUCKER in connection with rooster shaped lollipops because it was vulgar and 
scandalous), abrogated by In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
 30. In re Geller, 751 F.3d 1355, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (alterations omitted) (quot-
ing Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 124 (D.D.C. 2003)). 
 31. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE § 1203.03(b)(i) (Jan. 2015). 
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(2) [I]f that meaning is found to refer to identifiable persons, institu-
tions, beliefs or national symbols, whether that meaning may be dispar-
aging to a substantial composite of the referenced group.32 
Therefore, disparagement turns on how the mark is perceived, not by the mark 
holder’s intended message.33  Section 2(a) also requires cancellation of a reg-
istered mark if it is later challenged by a third party and is found to be dispar-
aging.34 
Given the lack of precision contained in the text of section 2(a) and the 
accompanying Examiner’s Manual, it is unsurprising that this test has been ap-
plied in an unpredictable and seemingly arbitrary manner.35  Indeed, courts 
acknowledge that these guidelines are “somewhat vague” and that the “deter-
mination of whether a mark is scandalous or disparaging is necessarily a highly 
subjective one.”36 
The only major constitutional challenge to section 2(a) was in In re 
McGinley.37  In McGinley, the applicant challenged section 2(a) as an uncon-
stitutional content-based restriction on speech and argued that it was void for 
vagueness.38  The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals quickly disposed of 
the First Amendment claim in three sentences, stating that: 
[T]he PTO’s refusal to register appellant’s mark does not affect his right 
to use it.  No conduct is proscribed, and no tangible form of expression 
is suppressed.  Consequently, appellant’s First Amendment rights 
would not be abridged by the refusal to register his mark.39 
The court’s essential conclusion was that section 2(a) is constitutional because 
it does not stop anyone from saying anything because the applicant is free to 
attach the rejected symbol to any product or service he or she wants to.40  Other 
 
 32. Id. (quoting In re Lebanese Arak Corp., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d 1215, 2010 WL 
766488, at *3 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 4, 2010)) 
 33. Id. 
 34. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 20:59. 
 35. See Lilit Voskanyan, Comment, The Trademark Principal Register as a Non-
public Forum, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1295, 1300 (2008). 
 36. In re In Over Our Heads, Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1653, 1990 WL 354546, at *1 
(T.T.A.B. Aug. 28, 1990) (alterations omitted) (quoting In re Hersey, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1470, 1471 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 10, 1988)). 
 37. In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981), abrogated by In re Tam, 
808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
 38. Id.  McGinley was decided by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the 
Federal Circuit’s predecessor court, and its holding was adopted by the Federal Circuit 
along with all other Court of Customs and Patent Appeals precedent. 
 39. Id. (citation omitted). 
 40. Id. 
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courts have generally followed McGinley,41 and the Federal Circuit has reaf-
firmed its central holding on more than one occasion.42  Nonetheless, McGinley 
was subjected to substantial scholarly criticism, which argued that the dispar-
agement provision violated the First Amendment rights of trademark owners.43  
Section 2(a) has been used to deny registration with greater frequency in recent 
decades. 
B.  First Amendment Issues 
Speech regulations are divided into two basic types: content-based re-
strictions and content-neutral restrictions.44  Content-neutral regulations are 
those “justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.”45  A 
regulation is content-based if it applies to speech because of “the topic dis-
cussed or the idea or message expressed.”46  Content-based regulations are fur-
ther subdivided into viewpoint-based regulations – those based on a speaker’s 
ideas or perspective – and subject matter regulations, the former of which is 
considered a “‘more blatant’ and ‘egregious form of content discrimination.”47  
A regulation is content-neutral if is “justified without reference to the content 
of the regulated speech.”48 
Different categories of speech receive different levels of First Amend-
ment Protection.  Until the 1970s, commercial speech49 was not covered by the 
 
 41. See Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 578 (5th Cir. 
2005); Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 12 F. Supp. 3d 439, 454–55 (E.D. Va. 2015). 
 42. In re Fox, 702 F.3d 633, 640 (Fed. Cir. 2012), abrogated by Tam II, 808 F.3d 
1321; In re Boulevard Entm’t, Inc., 334 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2003), abrogated 
by Tam II, 808 F.3d 1321; In re Mavery Media Grp. Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 
1994), abrogated by Tam II, 808 F.3d 1321.  But see Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 
1092, 1102–04 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 43. See, e.g., Jeffrey Lefstin, Does the First Amendment Bar Cancellation of Red-
skins?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 665 (2000). 
 44. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015). 
 45. Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 2229–30 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 
U.S. 819, 829 (1995)). 
 48. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (emphasis 
omitted) (quoting Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 771 (1976)). 
 49. Commercial speech is generally defined as speech that simply “propose[s] a 
commercial transaction.”  Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983) 
(quoting Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 760); see also Va. Citizens Con-
sumer Council, 425 U.S. at 765 (defining commercial speech as the “dissemination of 
information as to who is producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at 
what price”). 
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First Amendment.50  In the 1970s,51 the Supreme Court extended First Amend-
ment protection to commercial speech and regulations, which are evaluated 
under a four-part test.52  For commercial speech to have First Amendment pro-
tection, it must concern lawful goods or services and not be false or mislead-
ing.53  If it does, in order to survive First Amendment scrutiny, the regulation 
must directly advance a substantial government interest and not be more ex-
tensive than is reasonably necessary to advance that interest.54 
Trademarks are generally considered a form of commercial speech, as 
they are heavily connected with commercial transactions55 and are constitu-
tionally permissible to the extent trademark laws regulate confusing or decep-
tive uses, such as infringement or dilution.56  Trademarks are also considered 
a form of property when their secondary meaning becomes established through 
continued commercial use in association with a business’s goods or services.57  
Because of their status as the property of the mark holder, some courts simply 
assume property rights trump the First Amendment rights of infringers in dilu-
tion or infringement cases.58  For these reasons, trademark law has largely been 
immune from First Amendment analysis in the context of enforcement by mark 
holders, even as courts expand the scope of trademark protection.59 
C.  Unconstitutional Conditions 
Under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, the government may 
not condition an important benefit on a person’s surrendering an important con-
stitutional right, even if the government could withhold the benefit entirely.60  
Yet despite this seemingly simple statement, the doctrine is notoriously inco-
herent and inconsistent in its application.61  For example, the government may 
 
 50. See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Prelimi-
nary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1776 (2004). 
 51. See Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 748. 
 52. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 (1979). 
 56. Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Law as Commercial Speech Regulation, 58 S.C. 
L. REV. 737, 745–46 (2007). 
 57. Id. at 746. 
 58. See Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions 
in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 218 (1998); see also Dall. Cowboys 
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 1188 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 59. Tushnet, supra note 56, at 744–48. 
 60. Kathleen Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 
1415 (1989). 
 61. See generally Frederick Schauer, Too Hard: Unconstitutional Conditions and 
the Chimera of Constitutional Consistency, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 989 (1995) [hereinaf-
ter Schauer, Too Hard]. 
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss1/11
2017] SLANTING TRADEMARK CHOICES 199 
not deny tax exemptions to persons advocating the overthrow of the U.S. gov-
ernment,62 prohibit radio and TV networks that receive federal grants from ed-
itorializing,63 or condition millions in grants to private organizations to combat 
HIV/AIDS in developing countries on the recipient organization having an of-
ficial policy opposing prostitution.64  Such conditions penalize the exercise of 
constitutional rights much like a criminal fine would and could deter citizens 
from exercising their rights if they accept the benefit.65 
However, while the government may not penalize people by denying 
them important benefits because they exercise their constitutional rights, it is 
under no obligation to subsidize the exercise of constitutional rights and may 
also choose to subsidize certain rights, but not others.66  For example, the gov-
ernment can deny tax exemptions to religious colleges that discriminate on the 
basis of race,67 prohibit medical providers receiving Title X family planning 
funding from providing abortion related counseling while administering the 
program,68 refuse to award grants for indecent artwork,69 and require libraries 
receiving federal funding to install Internet filters to block pornography.70  
Moreover, the government may make openly content-based and viewpoint-
based decisions when awarding funds or creating a program to disseminate a 
message.71 
The distinction that has been drawn is the difference between non-subsidy 
and penalties, with the former being permissible, though application of this 
distinction has been unpredictable at best.72  For example, the Supreme Court 
of the United States upheld a ban on non-profits using tax-deductible contribu-
tions for lobbying but invalidated a requirement that prohibited recipients of 
federal broadcasting funds from editorializing on politics.73  Furthermore, eco-
nomically, there is virtually no difference between a tax exemption and a direct 
grant of funds, just as there is little financial difference between imposing a 
 
 62. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 528–29 (1958). 
 63. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 399–402 (1984). 
 64. Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 
2330–31 (2013). 
 65. Sullivan, supra note 60, at 1436–37. 
 66. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474–75 (1977). 
 67. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603–05 (1983). 
 68. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 201–03 (1991). 
 69. Nat’l Endowment for Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587–90 (1998). 
 70. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 207–14 (2003). 
 71. See, e.g., Rust, 500 U.S. at 194 (“When Congress established a National En-
dowment for Democracy[,] . . . it was not constitutionally required to fund a program 
to encourage . . . communism or fascism.”). 
 72. See Sullivan, supra note 60, at 1428.  While this is the line courts generally 
draw, it is not necessarily a helpful analytical tool.  See id. at 1420 (describing the 
distinction as conclusory). 
 73. Id. at 1440–42. 
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fine (an impermissible penalty) and denying a tax exemption (a permissible 
non-subsidy).74 
In the Supreme Court’s most recent unconstitutional conditions case, 
United States Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open So-
ciety International, the Court attempted to summarize its case law regarding 
the constitutional permissibility funding conditions into two categories.75  First, 
there are conditions that define the limits of the government program, i.e., spec-
ify the activities the government wants to subsidize.76  Second, there are con-
ditions that seek to “leverage funding to regulate speech outside the contours 
of the program itself.”77  However, the Court conceded that the line was hardly 
clear because the “definition of a particular program can always be manipu-
lated to subsume the challenged condition.”78  Generally, courts look to the 
“germaneness” of the condition to the government program at issue: the closer 
the connection, the more likely the condition is permissible.79 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
Writing for the majority, Judge Moore first determined that section 2(a) 
was a content-based burden/restriction on speech because it “applies to partic-
ular speech based on the topic discussed.”80  It was also viewpoint-based, as 
Congress enacted section 2(a) because it disagreed with the message: whether 
registration would be denied depended on whether it referred to that group in 
a positive or negative light.81  Moreover, the USPTO had registered marks re-
ferring to Asians in a positive way but had denied Tam’s application because 
it believed THE SLANTS would have been perceived as disparaging.82 
The majority then determined that section 2(a) was subject to strict scru-
tiny because it regulated the expressive – not merely commercial – aspects of 
Tam’s mark in that it did not target the trademark’s role as a source identifier 
for a good or service; instead, it focused on the allegedly disparaging message 
it conveyed to persons of Asian descent.83  Tam had chosen THE SLANTS to 
 
 74. See Schauer, Too Hard, supra note 61, at 993. 
 75. Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321 
(2013). 
 76. Id. at 2329. 
 77. Id. (emphasis added). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Sullivan, supra note 60, at 1420–21.  For example, Congress may choose not 
to subsidize abortions via Medicaid, but it may not withdraw all welfare benefits from 
anyone who has an abortion.  Id. at 1464–65. 
 80. In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (quoting Reed v. 
Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015)), corrected (Feb. 11, 2016), cert. granted 
sub nom. Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 1336.  The examples of positive marks referring to Asians were 
CELEBRASIANS and ASIAN EFFICIENCY. 
 83. Id. at 1337–38. 
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seek social change and challenge perceptions of Asian-Americans, to push peo-
ple by offending them.84  Because section 2(a) targeted speech that was of 
“public concern,” it was subject to strict scrutiny and “presumptively inva-
lid.”85 
Judge Moore then rejected the government’s argument that the First 
Amendment was not implicated because section 2(a) did not stop Tam from 
speaking or using the mark because the First Amendment protects from more 
than prohibitions, and the government “may no more silence unwanted speech 
by burdening its utterance than by censoring its content.”86  Through section 
2(a), the government had burdened Tam’s (and other people’s with disparaging 
marks) First Amendment rights by denying him the substantive and procedural 
benefits of federal registration because it disagreed with the message the mark 
conveyed.87  By denying these rights to Tam and other owners of potentially 
disparaging marks, section 2(a) threatened to chill protected speech by discour-
aging persons from adopting marks that might be perceived as disparaging.88  
The First Amendment proscribes this kind of government interference in the 
marketplace of ideas.89 
Judge Moore then turned to the government speech argument and quickly 
rejected it.90  First, placement on the register conveys one message – that the 
mark is registered – and does not associate the government with a mark’s mes-
sage.91  Second, the USPTO’s official position is that it “does not endorse any 
particular product, service, mark, or registrant” when it places a mark on the 
federal registry and doing so is in no way a “government imprimatur or pro-
nouncement” that the mark is a good one.92  Third, the use of a trademark sym-
bol – which mark holders do not even have to use – does not transform a trade-
mark into government speech; especially given the numerous marks, no one 
could reasonably claim the government endorses the particular messages of the 
marks on the registry.93 
Judge Moore then rejected the government’s claim that registration was 
merely a subsidy; she instead concluded that it was an unconstitutional condi-
tion denying Tam valuable rights and benefits, thereby infringing or burdening 
 
 84. Id. at 1338. 
 85. Id. at 1339. 
 86. Id. at 1340 (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664 (2011)). 
 87. Id. at 1342. 
 88. Id.  Section 2(a) covers marks that may disparage or be perceived as disparag-
ing, not merely marks that actually disparage. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 1346. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 1346–47 (quoting In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216, 
1219–20 n.3 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 3, 1993)). 
 93. Id. at 1347.  Judge Moore cited several examples, including CAPITALISM 
SUCKS DONKEY BALLS, TAKE YO PANTIES OFF, and MURDER 4 HIRE, U.S.  
Id. 
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his First Amendment rights.94  While Judge Moore acknowledged that the gov-
ernment may dictate how its own funds will be spent and that it may require 
private entities to convey the government’s message when using those funds, 
she noted trademark registration was not an attempt by the government to con-
vey its own messages through private parties.95  Furthermore, government sub-
sidies generally involve government funding or use of property, and the doc-
trine cannot be extended to permit the government to distribute any kind of 
legal right without regard to First Amendment limitations on content-based 
discrimination.96  Instead, courts have distinguished between cases involving 
Congress’s spending power, where the government dictates how appropriated 
funds will be spent, and those that do not.97  Registration, while valuable, does 
not involve government expenditures, and the USPTO is funded entirely by 
registration fees, not taxpayers.98 
Furthermore, Judge Moore explained that cases upholding conditions on 
subsidies are limited to cases where the condition directly advances the goals 
of the government program at issue.99  Section 2(a), on the other hand, does not 
advance the twin goals of federal trademark registration: protecting the rights 
of mark holders from appropriation and preventing consumer deception and 
confusion.100  Finally, the government’s argument would have expanded the 
subsidy exception so broadly that it would swallow the rule, allowing Congress 
to, for example, refuse copyrights to racist or misogynistic books.101 
Finally, Judge Moore explained that even if section 2(a) did regulate com-
mercial speech, it could not withstand intermediate scrutiny under the four-part 
test for commercial speech regulations because it did not directly advance a 
substantial government interest.102 
 
 94. Id. at 1348–49. 
 95. Id. at 1349–50. 
 96. Id. at 1351. 
 97. Id. at 1352. 
 98. Id. at 1353. 
 99. Id. at 1354. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 1354–55. 
 102. Id. 1356–58.  There were also a number of separate opinions.  Judges O’Mal-
ley and Wallach agreed that section 2(a) was unconstitutional on its face but stated that 
it was also unconstitutionally vague under the Fifth Amendment.  Id. at 1358–64 
(O’Malley, J., concurring).  Judge Dyk, joined in parts I–IV by Judges Lourie and 
Reyna, agreed that section 2(a) was unconstitutional as applied to Tam (and other core 
political speech) but was constitutional as applied to purely commercial uses.  Id. at 
1363–74 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Judge Lourie dissented 
and argued that section 2(a) was constitutional on its face and as applied to Tam, be-
cause refusing registration did not interfere with Tam’s ability to use the mark in com-
merce and that federal registration turned a mark into more than merely private speech, 
while also dryly noting that section 2(a) had been applied hundreds of times for decades 
only to suddenly become unconstitutional.  Id. at 1374–76 (Lourie, J., dissenting).  Fi-
nally, Judge Reyna dissented on the grounds that section 2(a) was constitutional and 
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V.  COMMENT 
This Note argues that the majority incorrectly applied the doctrine of un-
constitutional conditions and that, when it is properly applied, section 2(a) does 
not unconstitutionally burden First Amendment rights.  Part A assumes, ar-
guendo, that the majority was correct that the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine is the proper framework for analyzing section 2(a).  It then explains how 
the majority erred by focusing on whether section 2(a) was content-based and, 
instead, should have focused on the relationship between the conditions section 
2(a) imposes on federal registration and the goals of trademark law.  Part B 
explains how section 2(a) is constitutional because it advances the purposes of 
the Lanham Act by encouraging people to select more effective trademarks. 
A.  The Majority’s Decision Is Based on the Unconstitutional Condi-
tions Doctrine and Contains Several Errors 
The majority’s opinion discusses several doctrines but confuses them in 
certain ways.  First, the majority opinion basically approaches the issue back-
wards.  It starts by deciding that section 2(a) is content- and viewpoint-based, 
then determines that it regulates the expressive, not commercial, aspect of the 
mark; next, the majority decides that section 2(a) actually regulates speech and 
finally decides that federal registration is not a government subsidy or govern-
ment speech.103  But if section 2(a) did not regulate or burden speech, or if 
registration were a subsidy or a form of government speech, it would not matter 
– at all – if section 2(a) were content-based or the type of speech that is regu-
lated by it.104  This confusion is evident in the opinion’s choice of subsection 
titles, such as part II.C: “Section 2(a) Is Not a Government Subsidy Exempt 
from Strict Scrutiny.”105  This is inaccurate: subsidies are not “exempt” from 
First Amendment scrutiny; they are constitutional because they do not abridge 
any speech and thus do not implicate the First Amendment.106 
The majority also erred in holding that section 2(a) regulated the non-
commercial aspects of Tam’s mark because it confused the reason for the dis-
paragement provision and its actual impact on a mark holder.  Assuming, ar-
guendo, that denying registration under section 2(a) is based on non-commer-
 
did survive intermediate scrutiny because it did directly advance the government’s sub-
stantial interest in the orderly flow of commerce, the same interest the Lanham Act is 
intended to protect.  Id. at 1376–82 (Reyna, J., dissenting). 
 103. Id. at 1334–35 (majority opinion). 
 104. See supra Part III.B. 
 105. Tam II, 808 F.3d at 1348. 
 106. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (stating the government’s decision 
“not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right” (quot-
ing Regan v. Taxation With Representatives of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983))). 
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cial aspects of Tam’s speech, that does not change the fact that denying regis-
tration only affects the commercial aspects of the mark.107  All of the benefits 
of registration relate to a mark’s commercial use because, generally, a mark 
cannot be enforced against a person using the mark to express political views 
or parody.108  But federal registration (or denial of registration) does not – and 
cannot – affect Tam’s ability to express pride in his cultural heritage through 
his music, because section 2(a) does not stop him from saying anything: deny-
ing registration only makes it harder for Tam to prevent other people from say-
ing the same thing in commerce.109  All of the burdens on Tam (e.g., his ina-
bility to enforce the mark nationwide)110 are commercial burdens that do not 
inhibit Tam’s expressive message.  The inability to prevent others from using 
a mark in commerce in no way interferes with Tam’s ability to “editorialize on 
any subject, cultural, philosophical, or political.”111 
Therefore, the only basis for the majority’s opinion is the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine because, as the majority concedes, section 2(a) does not 
stop anyone from saying anything anymore than, say, denying a tax deduction 
does.112  Instead, it conditions the benefits of federal registration on a mark 
meeting certain requirements, including that the mark not be disparaging.113  
But if section 2(a) imposes an unconstitutional condition, then whether Tam’s 
mark is commercial or non-commercial speech, and whether section 2(a) is 
content-based or content-neutral, does not matter because there is no such thing 
as a content-based unconstitutional condition.114  Instead, the question is 
whether there is a reasonable relationship between the condition and the pur-
poses of the program.115  The majority appears to believe that the doctrine is 
 
 107. See Tam II, 808 F.3d at 1328–29 (discussing the various economic benefits of 
federal registration). 
 108. See Radiance Found., Inc. v. NAACP, 786 F.3d 316, 333 (4th Cir. 2015) (hold-
ing that “National Association for the Advancement of Colored People” did not infringe 
National Association for the Abortion of Colored People’s trademark because it fell 
under the non-commercial use exception). 
 109. See Tam II, 808 F.3d at 1378 (Reyna, J., dissenting). 
 110. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (2012).  An unregistered mark can only be enforced in 
the states where it has been used in commerce.  5 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 26:32. 
 111. Tam II, 808 F.3d at 1374 (Dyk, J., concurring part in part and dissenting in 
part) (quoting Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11 (1979)).  However, Judge Dyk’s 
concurrence errs because he concludes that trademark registration is a subsidy, see id. 
at 1369, but then states that section 2(a) is still unconstitutional because of the “indis-
putably expressive character” of Tam’s trademark.  Id. at 1373.  But, as explained 
above, denial of a subsidy cannot abridge the freedom of speech at all, and the strength 
of any government interest is irrelevant.  Congress could easily choose to subsidize pro-
Asian viewpoints but not anti-Asian ones.  See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 112. Tam II, 808 F.3d at 1335; cf. Authors League of Am. v. Oman, 790 F.2d 220, 
223 (2d. Cir. 1986) (same regarding copyright). 
 113. See 15 U.S.C. § 1152(a).  The other requirements are uncontroversial and es-
sentially state what is required to actually have a trademark. 
 114. See Tam II, 808 F.3d 1321. 
 115. Cf. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994). 
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limited to conditions implicating the First Amendment, but it applies equally 
to conditions on zoning permits, corporate licenses, welfare benefits, and gov-
ernment employment.116  What matters is not the content of the speech but the 
condition’s relation to the relevant government program.117  For example, con-
ditioning trademark registration on an applicant submitting to monthly war-
rantless searches of his home would be an unconstitutional condition on an 
applicant’s Fourth Amendment rights because it has nothing to do with the 
goals of trademark.118  But the government can deny food stamps to households 
that are needy because a member went on strike because the condition – that 
food stamp recipients must work if they can – was reasonably related to the 
program’s goals of supporting working families and encouraging employ-
ment.119 
Because whether section 2(a) is content-based or content-neutral is irrel-
evant to its constitutionality, the relevant question is whether the condition it 
imposes on the benefits of registration is sufficiently “germane” to the purposes 
of trademark law.120  As explained below, because the distinction drawn by 
section 2(a) is reasonably related to the purposes of trademark law, it is not an 
unconstitutional condition. 
B.  Section 2(a) Is Constitutional Because It Does Further the Goals of 
the Lanham Act and Trademark Law 
As discussed above, the majority erred in focusing on whether section 
2(a) was content- and viewpoint-based per se because all trademark law dis-
tinguishes words and symbols based on the information they communicate.121  
This Note accepts as correct the majority opinion’s description of the two goals 
 
 116. Sullivan, supra note 60, at 1428–30; cf. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 
U.S. 825, 834–37 (1987) (unconstitutional to condition zoning permit on owner’s grant-
ing of a travel easement through his backyard). 
 117. See Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
2321, 2329 (2013). 
 118. Cf. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 326 (1971) (cited in Sullivan, supra note 
60, at 1437 n.88). 
 119. See Lyng v. UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 364–66 (1988). 
 120. See Sullivan, supra note 60, at 1458; cf. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 
418 (2006) (stating that the government’s ability to restrict its employees’ speech turns 
on whether the restriction is “directed at speech that has some potential to affect the 
[governmental] entity’s operations”). 
 121. See supra Part V.A.; Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 
(1992) (explaining that a mark is “distinctive and capable of being protected if it either 
(1) is inherently distinctive or (2) has acquired distinctiveness through secondary mean-
ing”) (emphasis omitted).  A mark that is not distinctive is not a mark at all.  2 
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 11:2; cf. Ned Snow, Content-Based Copyright Denial, 90 
IND. L.J. 1473, 1498–1501 (2015). 
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of trademark law,122 but it disagrees with its contention that section 2(a) “is 
completely untethered to the purposes of the federal trademark registration pro-
gram.”123 
Trademark law’s primary purpose is to allow consumers to quickly iden-
tify the source and quality of goods or services.124  Marks lie on a spectrum of 
distinctiveness in ascending order: (1) generic terms, (2) descriptive, (3) sug-
gestive, and (4) arbitrary or fanciful.125  Arbitrary, fanciful, and suggestive 
marks are considered “inherently distinctive,” while descriptive marks must 
acquire a “secondary meaning” to become a mark.126  When the USPTO denies 
an application under section 2(a), it must determine that the mark (1) likely 
refers to identifiable persons, groups, or institutions and (2) disparages that 
group.127 
Denying the benefits of registration to marks that convey other infor-
mation furthers the goals of trademark law because the government has an in-
terest in ensuring that “the stream of commercial information flows cleanly as 
well as freely.”128  Consumers are bombarded with a massive amount of infor-
mation, and trademarks conveying information other than the source and qual-
ity of a good or service are less effective.129  A disparaging trademark adds 
surplus information that does not help consumers identify the source of a good 
or service to the commercial marketplace, increasing consumer search costs 
and making it more difficult for consumers to connect a mark with the under-
lying goods or services.130 
Federal trademark law contains numerous other limits on the subject mat-
ter and nature of registrable marks for certain classes of marks that may be 
highly likely to cause confusion.  For example, a mark cannot be registered if 
it consists or is comprised of “the flag or coat of arms . . . of the United States, 
or of any State or municipality, or of any foreign nation” or a “name, portrait, 
 
 122. See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc), corrected (Feb. 
11, 2016), cert. granted sub nom. Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016). 
 123. Id. 
 124. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 2:2. 
 125. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 11:2. 
 126. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769. 
 127. See TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 31, § 
1203.03(b)(i). 
 128. Tam II, 808 F.3d at 1376 (Reyna, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting 
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771–
72 (1976)). 
 129. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search 
Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 786–87 (2004) (“[T]rademarks . . . re-
duc[e] consumer search costs.  Rather than having to inquire into the provenance and 
qualities of every potential purchase, consumers can look to trademarks as shorthand 
indicators.”) (footnote omitted). 
 130. See id. at 788 (explaining doctrines in trademark law limiting the scope and 
type of marks in order to “preserv[e] the clarity of the language of trade”). 
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or signature” of a living person or a living or dead President.131  These prohi-
bitions are absolute and do not require a showing that a proposed mark is in-
sufficiently distinctive or is likely to cause confusion.132  Other statutes protect 
specific words, names, symbols, or designs and restrict their use by other enti-
ties.133  Finally, other parts of trademark law draw content-based distinctions; 
for example, a cause of action for dilution is limited to famous marks.134 
If disparaging marks are less helpful to consumers seeking to identify the 
source and quality of goods, then section 2(a) is not trying to “leverage [a gov-
ernment benefit] to regulate speech outside . . . of the federal program itself.”135  
Instead, it provides mild incentives for businesses to adopt marks that are more 
likely to aid the public by giving the most effective marks the substantive and 
procedural benefits of federal registration.136  While it is certainly arguable that 
section 2(a) does not substantially promote more efficient marks, it cannot be 
evaluated in isolation from the rest of federal trademark law. 
Additionally, actually registering disparaging marks may threaten First 
Amendment values.137  In fact, because Tam is not expressing an unpopular 
idea – that Asians are inferior or bad in some way – but is using the slur ironi-
cally to express pride in his cultural heritage, registering his mark would actu-
ally make it slightly more likely that such unpopular ideas would be chilled.138  
For example, the most likely scenario involving the infringement of THE 
SLANTS mark would appear to be another band with racist views about 
Asians.139  Disparaging marks have preexisting alternative meanings, both for 
commercial and non-commercial purposes; while trademark law contains var-
ious defenses protecting parody and fair use, those doctrines are not always 
 
 131. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(b)–(c) (2012). 
 132. Id.  Of course, many marks featuring a flag or emblem of any smaller foreign 
country, say Togo or Mongolia, seem unlikely to confuse consumers, assuming the 
other requirements of a trademark are met.  Such marks should still be enforceable 
under section 43(a).  See 15 U.S.C. § 1125. 
 133. See generally 6 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at app. A2 A (listing numerous 
symbol-specific limits on trademarks and use of various symbols). 
 134. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). 
 135. Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 
2329 (2013).  A condition is “germane” if it is reasonably related to the purposes of the 
government program at issue and/or the reasons the government could deny the benefit 
entirely.  See Sullivan, supra note 60, at 1413, 1421, 1457. 
 136. See supra Part III.A.1 for a discussion of the benefits of federal registration. 
 137. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 19:77.25. 
 138. Cf. Estate of Beckwith, Inc. v. Comm’r of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 543–44 
(1920). 
 139. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 23:1 (stating that the “likelihood of confu-
sion” is the fundamental test of infringement).  Granted, such a scenario seems unlikely, 
but if there is an appropriate place for far-fetched hypotheticals, it is in a law review 
article. 
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reliably applied.140  Section 2(a) may serve as a prophylactic, removing certain 
marks from consideration for the register. 
Somewhat similar concerns have long existed about descriptive marks: 
words, names, or symbols used to indicate a brand of product or service that 
also “describe[] the qualities or characteristics of the product or service sold 
under that mark.”141  Under the common law and the original 1905 Federal 
Trademark Act, such marks could not be registered, but the 1946 Lanham Act 
permits registration of such marks.142  Examples of descriptive marks include 
“Park N’ Fly” airport parking services and the “Sporting News” sports news 
publication.143  Granting exclusive rights to descriptive marks risks chilling 
commercial discourse by potentially preventing competitors from accurately 
describing their goods and services to the public and because such terms are 
almost certainly already in use.144  Similarly, a disparaging mark is already 
likely substantially in use because of its preexisting meaning, and the risk of 
infringement actions risk chilling speech.145 
Regarding the majority’s chilling effect analysis, this author is skeptical 
that section 2(a) has any real chilling effect on speech.  The majority’s fear 
appears to be something like the following: some people want to use trade-
marks identifying their goods or services to also communicate political mes-
sages; some of those people will want to choose marks that might be disparag-
ing; but because disparaging marks cannot be registered, that subset of people 
will choose other marks.146  But this argument is flawed: the issue is not 
whether the choice of trademarks is affected, but whether “certain ideas or 
viewpoints [will be driven] from the marketplace [of ideas].”147  Would Tam 
have altered the content of his music or the name of his band had he known he 
would be unable to register THE SLANTS as a trademark?  Possibly, but there 
is little evidence of this.  Furthermore, the Supreme Court of the United States 
has held that a condition that is “exceedingly unlikely” to prevent anyone from 
exercising a right will generally be constitutional.148 
 
 140. See generally id. § 24:126 (discussing “fair use” statutory defense for parody, 
criticism, and commentary). 
 141. Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment, 70 TENN. 
L. REV. 1095, 1097 (2003). 
 142. Id. at 1114–15. 
 143. Id. at 1112. 
 144. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 11:18. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (citing amicus 
briefs from the ACLU, First Amendment Lawyers Association, Rutherford Institute, 
and Pro Football, Inc.), corrected (Feb. 11, 2016), cert. granted sub nom. Lee v. Tam, 
137 S. Ct. 30 (2016). 
 147. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 
U.S. 105, 116 (1991) (emphasis added).  In fact, because disparaging marks are less 
effective, discouraging them from being used as trademarks is acceptable. 
 148. See, e.g., Lyng v. UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 365 (1988) (citing Lyng v. Castillo, 
477 U.S. 635, 643 (1986)). 
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 Moreover, Tam’s case appears anomalous in that very few marks 
found to be disparaging appear to have been used to express ideas or viewpoints 
but instead are used largely for shock value.  Consider also various trademarks 
owned by the Washington Redskins that have been the subject of decades of 
litigation; several were recently cancelled by the USPTO, whose decision was 
affirmed by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.149  No 
one contends that the Redskins adopted its various marks because it desired to 
express ideas or viewpoints about Native American issues.150  Admittedly, the 
Redskins’ example may be rather unusual – the term Redskins was not consid-
ered disparaging when it was registered – but this simply illustrates the relative 
paucity of disparaging trademarks chosen to express specific ideas or view-
points.151 
Finally, this Note’s argument is based on the assumption that the majority 
opinion was incorrect when it asserted that section 43(a)152 and state trademark 
laws cannot be used to enforce disparaging trademarks at all.153  It is one thing 
to create mild incentives to adopt certain marks over others but another to say 
one cannot have such a mark at all.  As the majority’s dicta is contrary to the 
longstanding interpretation and to the views of most scholars, it may have little 
impact, but if accepted, this principle would have much larger repercussions 
than the section 2(a) holding. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
On September 29, 2016, the Supreme Court granted the USPTO’s petition 
for writ of certiorari.154  The question presented is: “Whether the disparagement 
provision in 15 U.S.C. 1052(a) is facially invalid under the Free Speech Clause 
 
 149. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 490 (E.D. Va. 2015). 
 150. For another example, it seems unlikely that HEEB was chosen as a mark to 
express views about Jews.  See In re Heeb Media, LLC, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d 1071 (T.T.A.B. 
Nov. 26, 2008). 
 151. Pro-Football, 112 F. Supp. 3d at 479. 
 152. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012) (providing cause of action for infringement of an 
unregistered mark). 
 153. See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1343–45 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc), corrected 
(Feb. 11, 2016), cert. granted sub nom. Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016); see also Mark 
P. McKenna, The Implications of Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., PATENTLYO (June 
19, 2014), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/06/implications-blackhorse-football.html 
(describing the claim that section 43 is not available for marks barred by section 2(a) 
as “radical” and a “truly remarkable departure . . . that draws no support from the text 
of § 43(a)”). 
 154. See Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016) (granting certiorari). 
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of the First Amendment.”155  Oral argument was held on January 18, 2017, and 
the Justices appeared to be quite skeptical of the government’s position.156 
This Note has attempted to justify section 2(a)’s constitutionality using 
traditional principles of trademark law.  Whether these arguments are accepted 
remains to be seen.  Simon Tam presents about as sympathetic a plaintiff as 
one could have to challenge the disparagement provision: an Asian-American 
seeking to reappropriate a derogatory slur and use it ironically to express pride 
in his cultural heritage.157  The Court may be waiting for a case implicating the 
“immoral” or “scandalous” prong of section 2(a), which the majority explicitly 
reserved judgment on, but it is difficult to imagine the Federal Circuit’s deci-
sion being upheld given its reasoning in the instant case.  The Court has been 
far more tolerant of government regulations involving profanity, nudity, and 
sexual materials.158  Moreover, as previously noted, Simon Tam presents an 
extremely unusual example of a disparaging mark, which is almost certainly 
why he was chosen as the plaintiff in this challenge.  Most of them would likely 
be used for shock value and little more and would not be intended to “editori-
alize on any subject, cultural, philosophical, or political.”159 
In conclusion, thinking about section 2(a) in this way may have the salu-
tary effect of reemphasizing the traditional goals of trademark law by focusing 
more on consumers than on mark holders.  The majority opinion is full of First 
Amendment platitudes, but it makes no mention of the effects trademark reg-
istration has on the ability of anyone else to speak, despite the fact that the 
benefits of registration are all tools that make it easier for Simon Tam to pre-
vent others from using the term SLANTS in commerce.  In recent decades, 
there has been an increasing trend to “treat trademarks as assets with their own 
intrinsic value, rather than as a means to an end.”160  Trademark law would be 
well served to focus more on the interests of the public, not simply the interests 
of mark holders. 
 
 155. Brief for the Petitioner at I, Lee v. Tam, No. 15-1293 (S. Ct. Nov. 9, 2016), 
2016 WL 6678795, at *I. 
 156. See Amy Howe, Argument Analysis: Justices Skeptical of Federal Bar on Dis-
paraging Trademarks, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 19, 2017, 6:46 AM), http://www.sco-
tusblog.com/2017/01/argument-analysis-justices-skeptical-federal-bar-disparaging-
trademarks/. 
 157. Tam II, 808 F.3d at 1331. 
 158. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 748–51 (1978).  For an analysis of 
the USPTO’s application of the bar on marks that contain immoral or scandalous mat-
ter, see Megan M. Carpenter & Mary Garner, NSFW: An Empirical Study of Scandalous 
Trademarks, 33 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 321 (2015). 
 159. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11 (1979).  Judge Dyk cited Friedman in his 
separate opinion.  Tam II, 808 F.3d at 1373 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part).  In addition, if the immoral or scandalous prong is upheld, the USPTO may be 
able to fit most disparaging marks into those categories, to the extent they include what 
are basically insults. 
 160. Lemley, Death of Common Sense, supra note 19, at 1693. 
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